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THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION
Aziz Z. Huq*
What Is Populism? By Jan-Werner Müller. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press. 2016. Pp. 103. $19.95.
Introduction
As the twenty-first century staggers into its adolescence, a specter haunts
its liberal democracies. The new century was famously supposed to mark an
“end of history,” an age in which liberal democracy would congeal, inexorably and glacier-like, into a global, hegemonic plateau.1 Instead, the new century has proved convulsive, angry, and pregnant with fearful uncertainty,
even though it has not yet been punctuated by the world wars that convulsed
its precursor. Whether it is slouching toward global catastrophe, or redemption, remains a live question on which reasonable minds can disagree.
Why has our century proved so febrile? One obvious candidate cause is
political violence. The new century has been tragically striated by international terrorism, which took on new forms and political salience in the wake
of September 2001. But liberal democracies have faced intensive terrorism
threats from overseas since the early 1970s.2 Even if today’s specter may be
accelerated by public anxiety about terrorism,3 it cannot be reduced to the
fear of political violence.
A more consequential specter has instead emerged from within. For in
the first decade of the twenty-first century, a distinct form of political mobilization has simultaneously and unexpectedly emerged in several more or
less entrenched democracies. In Washington, Warsaw, Caracas, Budapest,
and Ankara, a political movement, party, or leader has seized the commanding heights by deploying political strategies or claims that can loosely be
denominated as “populist” (although that label is rarely embraced by those
to whom it is affixed). And even when populism falters at the polls, it can
* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Support for this research was supplied by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr., Fund. I am grateful to Tom
Ginsburg for his useful comments and to the editors of the Law Review for their careful and
diligent editing. All errors are mine.
1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man xi, 211 (1992).
2. See, e.g., 1970: Hundreds Held in Series of Hijacks, BBC: On This Day, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/6/newsid_2500000/2500667.stm [https://
perma.cc/KG3P-ZSDH] (describing the September 1970 hijacking of four New York–bound
airliners by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).
3. Aziz Z. Huq, Terrorism and Democratic Recession, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2974006
[https://perma.cc/FVK8-QL5T].
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score destabilizing policy victories, as the surprise outcome of the British
referendum on European Union membership demonstrates. In either case,
populism as movement or governance repudiates some or all of the values
and institutional commitments underpinning liberal democracy. Commitments that once seemed secure, unquestioned, and even hegemonic suddenly are publicly scorned and ridiculed as alien and unwelcome
impostures.
All this is obvious. But what exactly is “populism”? The question is
more perplexing than it seems at first blush. To the extent populism is often
characterized as a “style,”4 it can seem elusive and subjective. Further, the
term appears to encompass campaigning or governing in a way that claims
the authority of the people. But to the extent the term sweeps in political
movements or institutional arrangements that purport to vocalize “We the
People,” it might cover almost any kind of democratic politics. This provides
little analytic clarity. It also fails to capture the sense of novelty in recent
developments. For example, in the United States, conjuring the “people” in
political rhetoric has never been the preserve of one racial or social class. It
rather evinces some “idealistic discontent that did not always obey demographic borders.”5 But movements identified as populist today often isolate a
single ethnic or racial group as “the people,” either implicitly or explicitly, in
a deeply exclusionary manner.
Nevertheless, it will not do to reject the concept out of hand. A set of
recognizably parallel political strategies has yielded striking political developments, such as the 2016 Brexit and U.S. election surprises, the near-victories of the Front National in France in 2017, and the Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs in Austria in 2016.6 It is thus hard to deny that something distinctive is at work within contemporary democracy, something that should engage students of constitutional democracy in particular.
Legal scholars, and in particular constitutional law scholars, are only
beginning to grapple with the idea of populism and its implications for the
range of normative ends public lawyers typically pursue. It would be regrettable indeed if constitutional scholars, whether focusing on the domestic
American context or applying a comparative lens, ignored the rise of populism. The phenomenon presents a legion of new questions about the vitality,
feasibility, and future of what otherwise might have seemed fixtures in the
constitutional firmament—among them, the centrality of competitive elections to the constitutional form, the (contested) ideal of the rule of law, the
primacy of judicial review in constitutional enforcement, and the force of
individual rights. Populism calls all of these apparent bedrock principles into
4. See Benjamin Arditi, Populism, or Politics at the Edges of Democracy, 9 Contemp. Pol.
17, 20–21 (2003).
5. Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History 2 (1995).
6. See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism:
Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 16-026, 2016) (analyzing the potential political motivations behind the
popularity of Donald Trump and Brexit and how such motivations are now being used by
political parties in countries such as Austria and France).
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question. The threat to the constitutional predicates of liberal democracy
from this new style of politics may be either more or less grave. Some elements of current constitutional dispositions may be exposed whereas others
are sheltered. But without a vocabulary for designating the basic dynamics of
populism, and thereby plotting its potential repercussions, legal scholars are
bereft of basic, albeit needful, analytic tools for estimating the threat’s magnitude and implications.
This Review frames populism as a problem for public law scholars in
general and American constitutional scholars in particular. Its focal point is
a monograph entitled What is Populism? by Jan-Werner Müller,7 a text that
provides perhaps the most resonant recent theoretical introduction to contemporary populism. Müller sets forth a succinct and generalizable account
of the basic internal logic of populism as a strategy for both mobilizing
public sentiment and also deploying the levers of state power. He defines
“populism” as a coherent political strategy based on a “moralistic imagination of politics” as a Manichean confrontation between a morally purified
“people” and a corrupt and irremediable “elite” (pp. 19–20; emphasis omitted). As I explain below, Müller’s approach conflicts with other scholarly
definitional efforts in illuminating ways. Set in the wider intellectual context,
his monograph provides an effective fulcrum with which to dissect the complex relationship between populism and liberal constitutionalism in its
American variant.
Building on Müller’s account of populism, I sketch three ways in which
core elements of that account raise fresh challenges and questions about
American constitutional law. First, it is worth asking whether populism as it
manifests today is consistent with the purpose and design of political representation by the national institutions fashioned in the Constitution. Second,
populism calls into doubt important norms of legality upon which systemic
constitutional stability rests. Third, Müller’s definition of populism engenders serious challenges to traditional understandings of whether and how
individual constitutional rights can be vindicated. To the extent one perceives a new efflorescence of populism in national American politics—and
there is ample evidence, somewhat on the left and increasingly on the right,
to support this perception—the development presages an embarrassment of
novel analytic, prescriptive, and normative questions for American constitutional scholars. For ordinary citizens who stand outside the scope of the
populist project, the prospect of populist rule bodes ill for stability, legality,
and the preservation of rights related to equality and democratic
participation.
In Part I, I begin by situating Müller’s analysis and reconstruction of a
theoretically coherent account of populism as a political form in the larger
context of political-theory work on democracy and populism. In particular,
I contrast Müller’s definition with its competitors in the political-science
literature. In Part II, I deploy Müller’s theorization of populism as a platform to identify three implications of his analysis for U.S. constitutional law
7. Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
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sketched above. This is an exercise in diagnosis, and the question of how to
remedy populism’s pathologies must await another occasion given the limits
of the essay form.
I. The Difficulty of Discerning Populism
A. Varieties of Populism
Talk of “populism” is hardly new. To the contrary, the term can be used
to capture a range of historical phenomena across a widely dispersed geographic range. Mapping this range clarifies the challenge of identifying a
workable definition of populism, as opposed to “a map of the linguistic dispersion that has governed the uses of the term ‘populism.’ ”8 The result, as
Müller notes with worry at the opening of his monograph, is that “we seem
to lack coherent criteria for deciding when political actors turn populist”
(p. 2).
A history of populism might start with the early nineteenth-century European reaction to increasing commercial and social cosmopolitanism that
stressed “spiritual superiority,” ethnic identity, and cultural nationalism.9 In
the United States, it is possible to affix the label “populist” to national movements such as Andrew Jackson’s Democratic-Republican party in the 1820s
and 1830s, the Know-Nothings of the 1840s, and the Populist Party of the
1880s. Even within a singular national context, variation, rather than continuity among so-called populists, dominates. Hence, the Know-Nothings
are centrally identified by their ugly polemics and actions against Catholics,
East Asians, and immigrants of all stripes.10 The more agrarian and egalitarian populist movement demanded redistribution on the ground that
“[w]ealth belongs to him who creates it”11 but lacked the consistent bile of
its Know-Nothing precursors. Still, they were a “grass-roots revolt against
the elite or plutocrats.”12
A “modern form of populism” is traceable to General Juan Domingo
Perón’s Argentina (1946–1955), which was to prove a model for subsequent
Mexican and Brazilian leaders in short order.13 In Western Europe, aversion
to the actions of fascist governments before and during World War II dampened the appeal of far-right parties, slowing the rise of populism in most
contexts.14 Political movements that have been labeled populist started to
8. Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason 7 (2007).
9. Pankaj Mishra, Age of Anger: A History of the Present 169 (2017).
10. Roger Daniels, Coming to America 265–84 (2d ed. 2002).
11. Sean Wilentz, The Politicians & the Egalitarians: The Hidden History of
American Politics 56 (2017) (alteration in original).
12. Margaret Canovan, Populism 58 (1981).
13. Federico Finchelstein, Returning Populism to History, 21 Constellations 467, 468
(2014).
14. See Jean-Yves Camus & Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe 53
(2017).
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emerge only in the early 1980s, albeit with “relatively modest” electoral success.15 For example, the French Front National, founded by Jean-Marie Le
Pen in 1972, received only 0.76 percent of votes cast in the 1974 election.16 In
North America, the Canadian Social Credit party had regional political success in the post-war period but never secured national success.17 In the
United States, populism never entirely evaporated and never entirely failed.
Whereas George Wallace and Ross Perot were unsuccessful as presidential
candidates, it is quite plausible to discern elements of populism both in
midcentury anti-Communism and also in the racial politics of the
Nixon–Atwater campaign.18
Today, a wide range of candidates, parties, and movements can be categorized as labeled populist. In Europe, the most successful populist parties
are Fidesz in Hungary and the Law and Justice (“PiS”) party in Poland. Both
came to power on the basis of election campaigns raging against elites and
promising a fresh start for the disempowered or excluded. Both then implemented a wide array of constitutional and legal changes that dramatically
tamped down on political competition.19 Elsewhere in Europe, right-ofcenter parties have secured solid parliamentary footing by cultivating a fear
of Muslims and an aversion to immigration.20 In the United Kingdom, a
populist movement waved the same anti-elite and anti-immigration flags to
secure exit from the European Union.21 Unlike its Polish and Hungarian
counterparts, which have effectively consolidated power in ways that render
electoral displacement unlikely, the British populist U.K. Independence
Party fell into a disarray after the Brexit vote, with “prominent defections,”
“vicious feuding,”22 and (for now) an electoral rout.
Finally, U.S. populism has never left the American political scene. Both
the Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party movements, for example, exemplify forms of populism, as did the earlier campaigns designed to elicit the
15. Cas Mudde, Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So
What?, 52 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 1, 14 (2013).
16. John B. Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics 98 (2016).
17. Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction 23–24 (2017).
18. Id. at 24–25.
19. Miklós Bánkuti et al., Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. Democracy 138, 139 (2012); Joanna Fomina & Jacek Kucharczyk, Populism and Protest in Poland,
27 J. Democracy 58, 61–62 (2016).
20. See Farid Hafez, Shifting Borders: Islamophobia as Common Ground for Building PanEuropean Right-Wing Unity, 48 Patterns Prejudice 479, 481–82 (2014).
21. See Craig Calhoun, Brexit Is a Mutiny Against the Cosmopolitan Elite, New Persp. Q.,
Summer 2016, at 50, 51; Sara B. Hobolt, The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent, 23 J. Eur. Pub. Pol. 1259, 1263 (2016).
22. Griff Witte, From Britain’s Populist Right, Brexit Success Comes with a Poisoned Pill,
Wash. Post (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/for-britainspopulist-right-brexit-success-comes-with-a-poisoned-pill/2017/05/31/12b5c4c4-368a-11e7ab03-aa29f656f13e_story.html [https://perma.cc/3WUG-49PZ].
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votes of so-called Reagan Democrats.23 Yet in the 2016 campaign, Republican candidate Donald Trump and Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders
sought public support by “taking aim at the neoliberal agenda,” and so both
earned the sobriquet of populist despite their differences along many other
important margins.24 Further, 2016 marked the first time that a populist
candidate won the White House. Populism was no longer merely an electoral
strategy; it was a practice of national governance in the context of an extensive and highly bureaucratized administrative state in which values of legality, regularity, and technocratic competence loom large.
Nevertheless, it is important not to allow evenhandedness to get in the
way of clear analysis. On the Republican side, the 2016 campaign diverged
from earlier campaigns in other ways. It was the first time, for example, any
candidate attacked a sitting federal judge on the basis of his national origin,25 refused to disclose tax documents,26 threatened to prosecute his opponent,27 and explicitly refused to commit to accepting defeat at the polls.28 It
was also the first time campaign staff and supporters harassed and
threatened press perceived as hostile, sometimes with violent, anti-Semitic
threats.29 To the extent these tactics embody populism in action, they suggest
some tension with the ideal of liberal democracy under law as we today
understand it.
Given this historical and geographic heterogeneity, it is hardly surprising that standard examples of populism reflect a large diversity of institutional circumstances and policy orientations. One of Müller’s useful
preliminary contributions is his catalogue of all the analytic criteria that fail
as common ground for the identification of populists, including a singular
socioeconomic basis or a common emotional appeal to popular “anger” or
“resentment” (pp. 12–19).

23. See Judis, supra note 16, at 39–61.
24. Id. at 63.
25. Matt Ford, Why Is Donald Trump So Angry at Judge Gonzalo Curiel?, Atlantic (June
3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/donald-trump-gonzalo-curiel/
485636/ [https://perma.cc/XN5A-RPT9].
26. Steve Benen, Team Trump Admits, Public Won’t See Candidate’s Tax Returns, MSNBC
(Oct. 31, 2016, 9:22 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/team-trump-admitspublic-wont-see-candidates-tax-returns [https://perma.cc/NQ8P-BVK7].
27. Gregory Krieg, Trump Threatens to Jail Clinton if He Wins Election, CNN (Oct. 10,
2016, 11:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/09/politics/eric-holder-nixon-trump-presiden
tial-debate/index.html [https://perma.cc/TF5U-959J].
28. Patrick Healy & Jonathan Martin, Donald Trump Won’t Say if He’ll Accept Result of
Election, N.Y. Times (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/us/politics/presi
dential-debate.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
29. See, e.g., Matt Katz, Jewish Reporters Harassed By Trump’s Anti-Semitic Supporters,
NPR (July 6, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/06/484987245/jewish-reportersharassed-by-trumps-anti-semitic-supporters (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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Of particular note, Müller observes that it is a mistake to suggest that
populist movements cannot govern or pursue their own policy agendas because they must inevitably “re[ly] on . . . a bureaucracy.”30 Certainly, there
are some populist movements that fizzle as soon as they grasp power. In
addition to UKIP’s meltdown, populism in Taiwan has proved fragile in office, with one president lasting barely five months in power.31 But Müller
points out that “[p]opulists can govern” even if they “engage in occupying
the state, mass clientelism and corruption” (p. 102).
He might have added that it is equally possible for populists to build
highly successful political parties, which provide a social and organizational
basis for the exercise of political power. Hungary’s Fidesz party is one example; Turkey’s AK Party is another. Populism, in short, can take a variety of
more or less durable organizational forms.32 And whereas Müller identifies
the disappearance of “party democracy” as a cause of populism (p. 78), I
think it is more accurate to say that populism bubbles up when established
party systems are in crisis and realignment—as was manifestly the case in
the French presidential election of 201633—but that populism can work
through either a new party or a more charismatic mode lacking in any
broad-based party infrastructure.
This is hardly surprising on reflection: populism, still loosely defined,
has proved a durable and persistent feature of democratic practice around
the world for almost a century. Several regimes that can be denominated
populist, including the Peronist regime in Argentine, the AK Party in Turkey, Fidesz, and the PiS either remained in office for a protracted period or
appear to be well set up now to do so.34 The historical record thus belies any
suggestion that populism as a strategy of governance is either intrinsically
self-defeating or self-limiting. Left liberals hoping that President Trump will
30. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Can It Happen Here?: Donald Trump and the Paradox of Populist
Government 3 (Chi. Unbound Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, No. 605, 2017),
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory/606/ [https://perma.cc/
4H97-NF57].
31. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 17, at 38–39.
32. Robert R. Barr, Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics, 15 Party Pol. 29,
41–42 (2009).
33. See Uri Friedman, How Populism Took Root in France, Atlantic (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/france-election-populism/523500/
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
34. See Finchelstein, supra note 13, at 468, 476 (discussing the phenomenon of the
Pernoist regime); Emre Erdoğan & Sezin Öney, And the Winner of Turkey’s Presidential Election
Is . . . Populism, Wash. Post (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/08/08/and-the-winner-of-turkeys-presidential-election-is-populism/?utm_term
=.020d48ab0c5b [https://perma.cc/9AZH-WNQ2] (noting the AK party’s dominance since
2002); Thomas Greven, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States,
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 3 (May 19, 2016), http://www.fesdc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
publications/RightwingPopulism.pdf [https://perma.cc/9USZ-ERJS] (describing the Fidesz
Party as governing Hungary after the end of Soviet communism); Fomina & Kucharczyk, supra
note 19, at 58 (PiS).
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somehow self-immolate in a bonfire of his failed policies and engorged vanities are, in short, dallying with a fantasy.
Two further forms of internal heterogeneity across examples of populism beyond those enumerated are worth underscoring. First, it is implicit in
Müller’s analysis, but worth drawing out more expressly, that there are
populisms of both the right and the left, committed to very different bundles
of public policies. In the U.S. context, for example, it is conventional to
contrast candidates Trump and Sanders as divergent forms of populism.35 In
Latin America, which has witnessed three distinct waves of populist electoral
success since the 1930s, the resulting governments pursued both socialist
and neoliberal policy agendas.36
The potential for policy divergence even between closely aligning populist regimes is most crisply evident in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, Müller
observes that Fidesz’s Viktor Orbán has managed to make “savage cuts to
the welfare state,” while maintaining his popularity among the general public by posing conspicuously as “a strong leader ready to nationalize companies and use the state to protect ordinary folk” (p. 59). The PiS, in contrast,
“emphasises the need to tackle inequality and propagates strong welfare policies.”37 At the same time, differences in social policy do not prevent convergence on the creation of what Müller calls “defective democracy,” in which
changes to the electoral framework ensure that there is little chance of an
opposition victory at the polls (p. 58).
Second, Müller resists an explanation of populism that hinges on fears
of globalization or modernization (p. 12). Populism, in his view, is not
merely a political or psychological symptom of an underlying material distress (p. 15). The point might be both resisted and extended. On the one
hand, analysis of global income-distribution trends reveals that although the
last two decades have witnessed the rise of a “global middle class” in developing economic powerhouses such as India and China, it has also seen a
collapse in the share of incomes flowing to the working- and middle-class
populations of Europe and North America.38 Some commentators have diagnosed populism as “a solidaristic alternative to unbridled capitalism . . .
sustained by a purely negative definition of equality.”39 On this view, rising
support for populism “reflect[s] divisions between the winners and losers
from global markets, and thus whether lives are economically secure or
insecure.”40
35. See, e.g., Judis, supra note 16, at 62–87.
36. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 17, at 28–32.
37. Remi Adekoya, Xenophobic, Authoritarian—and Generous on Welfare: How Poland’s
Right Rules, Guardian (Oct. 25, 2016, 4:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2016/oct/25/poland-right-law-justice-party-europe [https://perma.cc/P6B6-AU53].
38. Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality 30–32 (2016).
39. Pierre Rosanvallon, How to Create a Society of Equals, Foreign Aff. (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-14/how-create-society-equals [https://perma.
cc/5KDE-RNDY].
40. Inglehart & Norris, supra note 6, at 11.
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But the reality, in my view, is somewhat more complex. There is some
evidence from the European context that economic insecurity is positively
correlated with support for right-of-center populism.41 At the same time, it
is hard to credit economic insecurity as a complete explanation for the success of populist parties. Populist parties have taken root in countries such as
Austria that are wealthy in both comparative and historical terms.42 In Turkey, the AK Party’s support base comprises not only the working class, but
also the petite bourgeoisie, who embrace “its record of economic growth
and relative stability after decades of turbulence.”43
More generally, a recent study using data from the well-respected European Social Survey found “mixed and inconsistent” evidence of economic
motivations for populism but stronger support for “cultural value[s],” including “anti-immigrant attitudes, mistrust of global governance, mistrust
of national governance, support for authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self-placement.”44 In the United States, Gallup survey data shows only
“mixed” evidence of economic distress as a predictor of favoring Trump in
the 2016 election and stronger evidence that “living in racially isolated communities with worse health outcomes, lower social mobility, less social capital, greater reliance on social security income and less reliance on capital
income, predicts higher levels of Trump support.”45 Again, my view is that
sociocultural factors—albeit ones closely tied to economic considerations—
explain recent populist successes at the polls better than experiences of economic distress alone.
B. Müller on Populism
The semantic promiscuity of the term “populism” has implications for
any definitional exercise. Populism’s specific articulations may well share
only a Wittgensteinian family resemblance,46 but maintaining the capacious
colloquial sense of populism might have consequences for analytic clarity
today. For example, constitutional scholars might be concerned with the implications of stylistic choices between different packages of political tactics
and claims for the stability and integrity of the constitutional system. If the
41. Duane Swank & Hans-Georg Betz, Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing
Populism in Western Europe, 1 Socio-Econ. Rev. 215, 215–16 (2003).
42. See, e.g., Reinhard Heinisch, Austria’s Populist Puzzle, Foreign Aff. (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/austria/2016-12-09/austrias-populist-puzzle [https://
perma.cc/53Y7-4BRF].
43. Max Rodenbeck, Erdogan’s New Sultanate, Economist (Feb. 6, 2016), http://
www.economist.com/news/special-report/21689871-under-recep-tayip-erdogan-and-his-akparty-turkey-has-become-richer-and-more-confident [https://perma.cc/Y9PL-HSYJ].
44. Inglehart & Norris, supra note 6, at 27–28.
45. Jonathan Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The
Case of Donald Trump, SSRN 1 (Nov. 2, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822059 [https://
perma.cc/B6UW-KWHT].
46. Margaret Canovan, Populism for Political Theorists?, 9 J. Pol. Ideologies 241, 243
(2004).
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adoption of a particular style of politics has downstream implications for the
achievement of needful public goods under a constitution—say, the realization of democratic voice, the remediation of abusive behavior using state
power, or the vindication of positive or negative rights—then scholars
should embrace a definition that helps them isolate the relevant forms of
political life. Definitions, that is, flow not from a theory of natural kinds but
from the scholar’s analytic and normative agenda.
It is in this context that Müller’s approach to populism is worth evaluating and comparing to close competitors. Müller has surfaced a definition of
populism that is more demanding than some alternative definitions. As
such, it provides a useful starting point for legal analysis, even if it might not
yield an appropriate frame for, say, a sociological analysis of what is, at least
in the demotic, labeled a species of populism.
Müller defines populism as a “set of distinct claims . . . [with] an inner
logic” (p. 10) pitched first in general terms, and then defined in terms of an
enumeration of specific traits. Pitched at this abstract level, populism is cast
as “a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the
political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified . . . people against
elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior”
(pp. 19–20; emphasis omitted). Populism hence is less a matter of policy
preferences and more a question of the guiding assumptions about how democracy can and should work and how leaders can and should relate to the
people.
His general claim can be decomposed into two elements. First, a populist asserts a “moralized antipluralism” predicated on the claim that “they,
and they alone, represent the people” (p. 3). Any other electoral option or
policy choice is illegitimate and perhaps futile, in the sense that it will
“amount to mere administration or cooptation into existing political and
social arrangements” (p. 69). By implication, there is always a remainder
that “can be dismissed as immoral and not properly a part of the people at
all” (p. 3). This element of Müller’s account mirrors the notion of ideological antisystemicness used to describe political parties that opposes some, but
not necessarily all, predicates of a democratic system.47
Core cases of moralized antipluralism are easy enough to adumbrate.
Müller quotes Donald Trump’s campaign statement that “the only important thing is the unification of the people—because the other people don’t
mean anything” (p. 22) as a recent example. Trump’s campaign threats to
prosecute Hillary Clinton and to resist any vote count that cut against him
have the same flavor.48
47. Giovanni Capoccia, Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment, 14 J. Theoretical Pol. 9 (2002) (distinguishing “ideological” and “relational” antisystemicness, and noting
that the latter “do[es] not necessarily require an opposition of the party to values that are
fundamental to all democracies,” whereas the former “consists in the incompatability of its
ideological referents, and therefore its political goals, with democracy”).
48. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. I limit myself to examples during the
campaign. There is a risk that if I select a post-inauguration example, that example will come
to seem quaint in light of subsequent, even more alarming events.
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Outside such core examples, however, there are likely to be many peripheral cases, which might count as moralized antipluralism depending on
whether they are understood to deny the legitimacy of opposing or alternative perspectives or values. For example, consider when one national political party declares that a president who has won in the electoral college is per
se illegitimate and must therefore be limited to one term at any and all cost.
This might be taken merely as a judgment about that president’s policy
choices. Alternatively, it may well be more than a merely consequentialist
claim. It may also sound in a moral register and repudiate the very possibility that the president might be recognized as legitimate. In the latter form,
such a declaration would count as populism. Müller might have said more
to help sort through these close cases.
Second, the populist has a “noninstitutionalized notion of ‘the people’ ”
(pp. 31–32). This means that the populist asserts or assumes that there is a
singular and morally privileged understanding or will that has not been
manifested through the formal structures of democratic choice. Müller
quotes Perón’s assertion that “the political leader is the one who does what
the people want” as an instance of such a claim of immanent and noninstitutionalized popular will (p. 31). This claim impinges on democratic accountability. Whereas on the ordinary understanding of democracy the
actions of a specific coalition or leader are always amenable to critique as
misleading or unlawful, it is never possible to launch a parallel challenge
against a populist leader. If “ ‘the people’ have willed it,” there is “no action
of a populist government [that] can be questioned” (p. 77). An implication
of this view—drawn out best by the political theorist Nadia Urbinati—is
that the back-and-forth of electioneering and legislative debate is superfluous.49 If the leader intuits the needs of the people, the process of representation though elections is a mere formality.
Again, there are core and peripheral instances of this logic. For example,
national security decisions in the American context are often framed as beyond questioning in the courts, with dissenting voices receiving vituperative
criticism. At what point does the demand for absolute deference on national
security policy, and the dismissal of criticism, amount to a form of populism? The path of extravagant claim making by presidents in the name of
national security, in my view, makes this a very open question in the U.S.
context. Müller supplies the core version of the populist logic but does not
spell out how this sort of peripheral case should be categorized.
Here, Müller’s analysis harkens back to a dynamic identified by Margaret Canovan, an earlier theorist of populism. Canovan linked populism to
what she called the “Bagehot Problem,” after the leading theorist of the British constitution, Walter Bagehot.50 Bagehot had celebrated the British monarchy on the ground that it was intelligible to the mass of the citizenry.51 By
49. See Nadia Urbinati, The Populist Phenomenon, 51 Raisons Politiques 137, 145–46
(2013).
50. See Canovan, supra note 46, at 244–45.
51. See id.
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contrast, modern representative forms of democracy tend to be predicated
on complex institutional arrangements that seek to account for a plurality of
interests and public goods that might bear on governance. The result, Canovan noted, is often “a tangled network that cannot make sense to most of
the people it aims to empower.”52 Populism exploits the necessary complexity of representative democracy by offering a more parsimonious, seemingly
more candid, and more authentic alternative.
The Bagehot Problem is surely one that bedevils the American system of
a tripartite federal government, intertwined with a lattice of checks and balances and perched precariously on a jostling array of sovereign states with
shared, overlapping regulatory authority. The American system blends,
trims, and tuck-points a governing frame that makes little intuitive sense.
Little wonder then that the history of American politics can be glossed as the
ebb and flow of populist formations.
So defined, populism exploits and amplifies a series of basic dilemmas
of constitutional democracy. These dilemmas are both theoretical and practical. At a conceptual level, democracy demands a definition of the relevant
polity but itself supplies no criteria for the identification of its own boundaries (pp. 80–81). At a moral level, democratic procedures (and, in particular,
legislative institutions) are justified by the fact of deep and abiding disagreement within a polity.53 But Müller contends the empirical fact of pluralism,
and hence disagreement, has no necessary normative implication of recognition and respect for pluralism (p. 82), at least without deriving an “ought”
from an “is.” (Why live with disagreement, when you can extirpate it? The
question does not answer itself.) Finally, there is a practical problem of how
democracies respond to endogenous movements that aim, explicitly or implicitly, at dismantling the institutional struts of democratic choice.54 Under
what circumstances is a democratic system warranted in taking antiliberal
steps in self-preservation?
C. Alternative Definitions of Populism
Is Müller’s the most useful definition of populism? Consideration of
three alternatives circulating in the contemporary literature suggests that it
is.
First, John Judis defines populism in terms of “the conflictual relationship between” a “people” and an “elite.”55 Judis’s definition encompasses a
range of political actors who have in some way juxtaposed themselves
against an extant power structure. At its margins, Judis’s conceptualization
seems to sweep in any and all parties that position themselves in relation to
52. Id. at 245.
53. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 23–24 (1999) (noting that legislatures “do [their] work by internalizing [the] disagreements, by building them into the institutional structure of [the] assembly”).
54. See p. 83.
55. Judis, supra note 16, at 15.
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incumbents. It is not hard to imagine that this might capture virtually all
insurgent political movements at some moment in time. So defined, populism is an immense category with little resolving power.
One might use Müller’s definitional approach to resist this conclusion
and determine that what some political scientists have called “agrarian populism” falls outside the category of interest here.56 The American Populist
Party, for example, offered acerbic critiques of capitalists and industrialists
and indulged in what now is recognized as invidious invectives against Asian
and black labor; but the Party was not antipluralist. To his credit, Müller
recognizes as much (p. 88). To some, exclusion of what might have been
thought a core case may seem problematic. Alternatively, Müller’s antinominalism advances a theoretical agenda in ways that bring clarity to other
questions of constitutional law and design.
Second, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser define populism as
“a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated
into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the
corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
volonté générale (general will) of the people.”57 While there are many parallels between this and Müller’s definition, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser introduce additional new criteria beyond Müller’s, including “homogenous,”
“antagonistic,” “pure,” and the “general will.”
The latter concept derives from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s well-known
theorization of the social contract. It also introduces substantial new complications. Rousseau does not invoke the idea of a “general will” without
specifying a precise institutional setting. Although he assumed a well-ordered society would possess a general will, he anticipated that a process of
voting would be required to elicit it and even “carefully specified” the voting
procedure used to identify the content of the general will in a particular
case.58 Whereas invocation of Rousseau’s general will implies that the choice
of voting procedures has a “moral significance,” Müller’s more abstemious
definition stresses the fact that populist claims to legitimacy supervene over
and render irrelevant the technical details of electoral systems. Further,
Rousseau’s account of the role of the people in government is not inconsistent with the idea that the people would “discuss and oppose” measures
initially proposed by the government.59 In this sense, it is not easily squared
with populism.
Finally, Müller’s definition is in stark contrast with an account of populism that emerges out of the post–Frankfurt School body of critical theory
closely associated with Ernesto Laclau. For Laclau, populism arises from unsatisfied demands by marginalized and frustrated members of the polity,
56. Canovan, supra note 12, at 8.
57. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, supra note 17, at 6.
58. Melissa Schwartzberg, Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules, 36 Pol.
Theory 403, 403, 419 (2008).
59. Ethan Putterman, Rousseau on the People as Legislative Gatekeepers, Not Framers, 99
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 145, 145 (2005).
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demands articulated in a process of mobilization that terminates in “that
moment of crystallization that constitutes the ‘people.’ ”60 Laclau’s concept
of populism is synonymous with the political, which in turn seems to exclude “sedimented social forms which have blurred the traces of their original political institution.”61 The net result is populism comes to stand for all
that is fluid, contingent, and subject to contestation—a floating platform
that either can come to stand for the vindication of human rights (or totalitarianism)62 or seems necessary for the vindication of popular sovereignty.
Unlike Müller, who categorically rejects the notion that population is
necessary for “reasserting popular sovereignty” (p. 103), Laclau tenders an
understanding of populism hinged on process rather than a polity’s discernable traits. That process, moreover, cannot easily be discerned in real-world
examples. As one commentator notes, “the task of determining when an
ephemeral equivalence becomes a stable system of signification” is not easy
or objective.63 Laclau’s account also has a trace of teleological, Marxian optimism about the spontaneous, organic eruption of the oppressed. As such, it
rests on a controversial set of predictive and normative commitments—orthogonal to the liberal, democratic commitments that animate much of
American constitutional law—such that its utility as a general framework for
identifying and analyzing populism is necessarily limited.
To recapitulate, then, Müller’s is but one in a crowded field of competing contemporary approaches to populism. His twofold definition focusing
on moralized antipluralism and a noninstitutionalized idea of the people usefully excludes the large class of cases in which a movement has been categorized as populist simply because its rhetorical strategy aligns it with the
“people” (however that term is understood): that is too blunt an analytic
instrument. Yet Müller also evades theoretical entanglements with Rousseauian notions of the general will or Marxian critical theory that entangle
other approaches.
This is not to say that Müller’s approach is divorced from theory.
Rather, populism as mapped by Müller claims intellectual roots in the work
of German jurist Carl Schmitt (pp. 27–29). Like Laclau, Schmitt offered a
definition of what constitutes the political, albeit one with no aspirational,
Marxian overtones. For Schmitt, the political was the “most intense and extreme antagonism” between the friend and the enemy; this antagonism

60. Laclau, supra note 8, at 72–77, 93.
61. Id. at 154.
62. Id. at 171.
63. See Benjamin Arditi, Populism Is Hegemony Is Politics? On Ernesto Laclau’s On Populist Reason, 17 Constellations 488, 495 (2010).
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arises when “one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity” within the polity.64 Dismissing the “empty and trivial formality” of legislative debate, Schmitt went on to praise dictatorship as “just as little the
definitive antithesis of democracy as democracy is of dictatorship.”65
Müller captures this Schmittian quality of populism—its contempt for
the complex and cumbersome mechanics of democratic representation, its
tendency to see absolute conflict between social group as constitutive of the
state, and its judgment that “political parties in general . . . pose a threat to
state sovereignty”66—that distinguishes it from other styles of political mobilization. And it is what makes populism a distinctly worthwhile object of
legal and constitutional analysis.
Schmitt wrote five books and more than thirty-five tracts in support of
the Third Reich.67 So it should not be surprising that his logic of populism
shades into more sinister “Caesarian” logics.68 Pursued far enough, that is,
the dynamic of populism entails not just the “moral[ization of] political
conflict” (p. 42); it requires the triumph of one right side and the withering
away of political pluralism. The logic of populism is thus contiguous with (if
not identical to) the defense offered by Giovanni Gentile of “[t]he Fascist
State . . . [as] a people’s state, and, as such, the democratic State par
excellence.”69
Müller’s definition of populism as a touchstone for constitutional analysis thus captures a style of political claim-making, and a school of political
mobilizations, that both raise concerns about the vitality and survival of
democracy. In contrast to Laclau’s approach—which takes populism as the
realization par excellence of autochthonic and participatory politics—Müller
casts populism as democracy’s natural antagonist. It is this position that
renders it of especial interest to legal and constitutional scholars.
II. Populism and the American Constitution
The Constitution creates a set of institutional channels for national
politics as a way to create certain public goods. The political institutions
created by the Constitution must decide how plural and partially incommensurable goals are pursued, and traded off, even as they resolve ambiguities in the definitions of the goals themselves. The capacity of institutions
fashioned by the Constitution to achieve these ends depends on the style of
politics employed by those elected to public office.
64. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 28–29 (George Schwab trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1932).
65. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 32, 50 (Ellen Kennedy
trans., MIT Press 1988) (1926).
66. David Dyzenhaus, Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?, 91
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 121, 125 (1997).
67. Richard Wolin, Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State, 19 Theory
& Soc’y 389, 389 (1990).
68. Urbinati, supra note 49, at 148.
69. Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophical Basis of Fascism, 6 Foreign Aff. 290, 302 (1928).
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Political leadership in a populist vein, whether in the White House or
Congress, therefore has implications for the Constitution’s ability to realize
public goods or to channel and resolve disagreements as to which, and how
much, of such public goods should be realized. My aim in this Part is to
frame a series of questions about the interaction of constitutional design in
the U.S. context and populism, the political style defined by Müller in terms
of moralized antipluralism and a noninstitutionalized idea of the people.
This Part takes up three ways in which those interactions may play out.
The question examined here—how populism (as defined per Müller)
and constitutional design interact in ways that influence the realization of
valued public goods—must be distinguished from a lexically proximate
question of whether constitutionalism should be “popular.” Müller notes as
much,70 but only fleetingly, and it is useful to say why.
Popular constitutionalism claims that the people “retain authority in the
day-to-day administration of fundamental law.”71 There is no necessary connection between popular constitutionalism so conceived and the constitutional claims advanced by populists. Instead, the logic of populism suggests
that the leader channels a singular and prepolitical understanding of what
the people want (p. 25). Broad public contestation over this vision may be
inconsistent with the populist style in many instances. In short, if there is a
linkage between popular constitutionalism and the constitutional views of
populist movements it is likely a negative, aversive one.
The question pursued here is also distinct from the (related) question of
whether the Constitution’s structuring of democratic politics makes it more
or less likely that populists in fact come to power at the national level. The
latter question is most sensibly asked in a comparative context, in which one
can contrast the relative risks of presidential and parliamentary systems. The
analysis here asks whether populism once in power, or at its gates, imposes
pressures on the U.S. Constitution (or at least its continued operation in
practice) in terms of its continuing ability to produce valuable public goods
of a national character.
A. Representative Democracy Under the Constitution
Perhaps surprisingly, the original design of the Constitution and the
implicit representational theory of populism start from the same premise—
the inimical relationship between a government of the people on the one
hand and a diversity of political parties on the other hand. Common diagnosis, however, does not conduce common cure.
I have already sketched populism’s aversion to a multiplicity of parties.
What of the Constitution’s? The latter’s designers had a negative view of the
national political parties that some of them would go on to create. They
viewed national political parties as “vehicles by which self-interested groups
70. See p. 61.
71. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 959, 961
n.3 (2004).
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. . . coordinated and pressed their efforts to seize political power . . . [and]
pursue their own private self-interest at the expense of the common good.”72
In Federalist 10, Madison condemned faction as a “disease” and a “dangerous vice” that “tainted our public administration” in language that resonantly applied to parties.73 And in his Farewell Address, George Washington
also cautioned against parties’ “baneful effects.”74 Parties nonetheless
emerged (and, indeed, coalesced around Madison, Jefferson, and Washington) because of the candidates’ need to mobilize potential voters. In other
words, the Constitution’s reliance on elections generated unraveling pressure
on the design’s antipluralist commitments.
Even if populism shares with the Constitution’s drafters an aversion to
the multiplicity of parties that we now associate with competitive democracies, it nonetheless reaches for a different remedy. The Constitution maintains a commitment to pluralism that populism denies. This is restaged most
overtly in the document’s recognition of the independent authority of the
sovereign states.75 In the Framers’ original scheme, these supplied alternative
centers of political authority that could be mobilized were the central government to overreach.76
Additionally, the Framers installed an elaborate apparatus of federal
representation, including tripartite reflection of the people in two houses
and the presidency, staggered elections, and (prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment) indirect selection of the Senate. That finely calibrated and
complex machinery would perform a clarifying filtration of the vast array of
public preferences, and thereby “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom
may discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love
of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”77 In the background to the mechanism of democratic transfiguration
is an implicit, yet firmly held, belief that a natural aristocracy existed, ready
to sift out and slot into legislative and executive leadership positions.78
Populism as a political strategy exploits both these solutions to the
problem of representation. First, as noted, the complexity of the filtration
mechanism invites the Bagehot Problem limned above.79 The legislative process’s complexity, and in particular its proliferation of vetogates, invites at
72. James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 667, 668
(2000).
73. The Federalist No. 10, at 77–78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
74. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1902, at 213, 218 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1907).
75. See U.S. Const. amend. X.
76. The Federalist, supra note 73, No. 46, at 298–99 (James Madison).
77. Id. No. 10, at 82 (James Madison).
78. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment 515 (1975) (“In most American
colonies a patrician elite . . . stood ready to play the role of natural aristocracy.”).
79. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
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best deliberate and careful policymaking, and at worst gridlock. Second, the
constitutional system’s reliance on the assumption that a natural aristocracy
would populate federal offices80 leaves the system vulnerable not only to attack on the basis of its implicit elitism but also because it is open to the
populist to assert that he or she is a constitutional aristocrat, privileged with
unique access to and understanding of the popular will.
The Constitution’s theory and institutional practice, in short, invite a
populist riposte. And they have received such a response repeatedly from the
time of Andrew Jackson onward.81 To be sure, this Achilles’ heel in the constitutional design has rarely been successfully exploited at the level of the
White House—but it is quite plausible to hypothesize that its persisting
presence ensures the continuing availability of populism as a viable political
strategy at the national context.
B. Legality and the Stability of the Constitutional System
Populist leaders and movements claim authority not on the basis of
electoral success but on the basis of their unique and privileged access to the
will of the people. A correlative of this charismatic claim to legitimacy is that
both the “empirical outcome of elections” and the quality of policy consequences are deemed no longer relevant as criteria of democratic judgment
(p. 52). The populist’s claims, as Müller puts it, are “immune to empirical
refutation” (p. 102). In particular, evidence that populist movements are as
corrupt as the former elites they inveighed against and ousted can have no
effect on their public standing (pp. 4, 47). As the sociologist Arlie Russell
Hochschild observes, populists appeal not to voters’ material self-interest but
to their “emotional self-interest.”82 By presenting themselves as defenders of
genuine national interests, populists can deflect blame for material degradation in their constituents’ conditions (pp. 58–59). Indeed, to the extent that
support for populists is correlated with the felt experience of limited life
opportunities for self and family, populists’ failure to better the material
conditions of their constituents may well prolong the conditions that produced their ascent in the first instance.
This stock of populist tactics for preserving power, Müller notes, has the
tendency to provoke “severe constitutional conflicts” (p. 67), often driven by
presidential initiatives. Populist executives in Venezuela, Bolivia, Hungary,
and Poland have all pressed (and in some instances achieved) constitutional
or quasi-constitutional changes that weaken coordinate branches or freestanding institutions of horizontal accountability, such as ombudsmen.83
The modal forms of populist governance that Müller identifies—stacking
80. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
81. See supra Section I.A.
82. Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land 228 (2016).
83. See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2901776
[https://perma.cc/RAW6-5BSV].
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the bureaucracy with partisans, making patronage a regulative principle of
government largess, and using law to suppress dissent and undermine civil
society—all run up against constitutional constraints contained in a relevant
organic document, deepening the legal and institutional conflicts implicit in
their efforts to maintain power.84
Transposed to the American context, Müller’s model of populist governance has subtly different implications. On the one hand, the Constitution
reflects a commitment to an ideal of legality and the rule of law at a relatively abstract level. Several clauses in the Constitution reflect textual commitments to ideals of legality, formality in the exercise of governmental
power, and an aversion to personalistic modes of governance. The Take Care
Clause, for example, seems to impose an obligation of legalistic compliance
on the president tied to the scope of statutory mandates.85 As Justice Holmes
once said,“[t]he duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a
duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than
Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”86 The Supremacy Clause and the
Oath Clause of Article VI, analogously, impose direct obligations of fealty to
written law on both state and federal officials.87 The oath, Chief Justice John
Marshall famously underscored in Marbury v. Madison, “certainly applies in
an especial manner” to “conduct in [an] official character.”88
Beyond the textual commitment to legality that coruscates across the
Constitution’s surface, there is a deeper relation between legality and the
U.S. constitutional order. It is difficult to see how the processes of electoral
choice, legislation through bicameralism and presentment, and implementation through retail, discretionary prosecutorial and regulatory decisionmaking happen without a high degree of internalization of the law. Absent a
shared commitment to the law, that is, the constitutional system could not
function in the manner the Constitution’s text suggests as a going concern.
In this regard, it is incorrect to distinguish constitutional rules from the
norms and conventions that surround them. Norms of legality and constitutional rules are symbiotic, not separable.
But move from the abstract and another picture emerges. Our Constitution is conspicuously lacking in the practical instruments needful to making
the abstract ideals of legality, in the sense of limiting government action to
the ex ante boundaries established in written law, that other countries’ constitutions have. The U.S. Constitution, for example, does not protect the
civil service from polarizing co-option by a populist president. To the contrary, the Take Care Clause has been persistently (if erroneously) read to vest
the president with largely unfettered authority to terminate officials, even
84. Id.
85. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
86. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Where Congress has over time accreted a large volume of overlapping statutory authority, it may fairly be
questioned whether this clause has the same effect.
87. U.S. Const. art. VI, §§ 2–3.
88. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
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when they are engaged in oversight of malfeasance of those close to the Oval
Office.89 This arrangement exacerbates the risks of populist officeholding
without discernable countervailing gains.
Nor does the Constitution establish any independent bodies of internal
accountability within the federal government beyond the tripartite division
of the branches. Notwithstanding Madison’s famous dictum in Federalist
51,90 the U.S. Constitution is singularly wanting in “auxiliary precautions,”
particularly ones that remain effectual in moments of unified government
and judicial sympathy with a dominant regime. Rather, the Constitution
depends on the exercise of ex post discretion by voters at the ballot box as
“the primary control on the government.”91 But if populist leaders are successful in appealing to voters’ emotional self-interest, thereby deflecting
blame for deterioration in material condition, that “primary control” will
fail as a disciplining mechanism.
In sum, the Constitution’s combination of a high-minded but abstract
commitment to legality and the rule of law with a singular dearth of practical instruments for maintaining those system-level properties regardless of
the level of partisan heterogeneity across the branches renders the Constitution perhaps uniquely vulnerable to some of populism’s most corrosive effects. Rather than a wise institutional equilibrium, this might be glossed as a
design especially susceptible to the pathological tendencies that emerge
when populists strive to maintain power.
C. The Challenge to Constitutional Rights
Populist governments impose stress on the individual interests protected
in the form of constitutional rights along two distinct margins. First, the
installation of partisan cronies in bureaucratic power and the reliance on
patronage as a mechanism for maintaining prestige and authority creates the
risk that “only some of the people should get to enjoy the full protection of
the laws” (p. 46).
Although Müller does not develop this point, populism pushes even further than mere unequal protection. If populism is characterized by a Manichean division of the polity into the people and its enemies, and if reliance
on charismatic and personalistic means of maintaining power brings a disregard for the truth, then the populist leader will be tempted strongly to take
one step further. It is a logical consequence of populism to identify groups
(whether political, racial, ethnic, or class-based) as the enemy and to attack
them on the basis of false accusations. Policy failures may render it especially
likely, and especially alluring, to engage in the degradation of the other, with
physical violence following somewhat inexorably in the wake of rhetorical
violence.
89. See, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 164.
90. The Federalist, supra note 73, No. 51, at 322 (James Madison).
91. Id.
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What follows might be described as a form of “discriminatory legalism”
(p. 46), in which groups styled as the people’s enemy receive markedly harsher treatment. Alternatively, a populist might try to govern by relying
upon, or even creating, a series of “small emergencies,” in which “problems
. . . are deemed worthy of exceptional solutions, but are simultaneously
deemed too minor to warrant a full-fledged reassessment of constitutional
structures and constitutional aspirations.”92 It is not hard to see how this can
tip imperceptibly or suddenly into atrocity, whether large or small.
Second, the populist’s “moral[ization of] political conflict” (p. 42) creates a pressure toward the dismantling of institutions that enable fair elections in which populists’ opponents have a chance of winning. A wide range
of tools, often facially innocuous, allow for effectual electoral competition to
be corroded from within. For instance, Hugo Chavez’s government responded to the victory of opposition candidate Antonio Ledezma in the Caracas mayor’s election in 2008 by creating a new “capital district” and
transferring a portion of the budget and authority of the mayor’s office to
the new entity controlled by the ruling party.93 When the latter lost 2015
elections to the National Assembly, it again simply created a new
legislature.94
Once again, there is an odd dissonance in the American Constitution.
On the one hand, the text of the Constitution is replete with individual
rights, albeit framed at a general and relatively abstract level.95 On the other
hand, with the exception of the Suspension Clause,96 the Constitution does
not address the mechanisms through which infringements on such rights
would be prevented or remedied. Indeed, the availability of remedial mechanisms has never been certain, stable, or independent of the vicissitudes of
the partisan-political moment. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the
task of constitutional remediation fell largely on state courts, applying statelaw forms of action.97 The Court has allowed much of this common-law
structure to be overtaken by statutory remedial mechanisms available in the
Administrative Procedure Act,98 or has replaced it with federal common law
rules that are far less generous in their remedial effect.99 If the coverage of
92. Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 835, 835 (2006).
93. Tamara Pearson, Venezuelan President Designates New Caracas Head and Communications Minister, Venez. Analysis, (Apr. 16, 2009), https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/4371
[https://perma.cc/2N9K-VUUA].
94. Daniel Lansberg-Rodrı́guez, Maduro and His Imaginary Parliament, Foreign Pol’y
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/22/president-maduro-and-his-imaginaryparliament-venezuela-elections/ [https://perma.cc/Y8A4-8BCB].
95. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
96. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
97. Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65
Duke L.J. 1, 13–14 (2015).
98. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
99. See Huq, supra note 97, at 15–19; see also Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent
Fault, 131 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2940016 [https://perma.cc/A3B2-GJ8R].

1144

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:1123

constitutional remedies in the mine-run of circumstances is patchy, its application to instances in which the president invokes the national interest as
in peril is varnish thin. Hence, whatever rights might exist on the books, a
populist is likely to find that the clunky apparatus of judicial enforcement
creates little effectual checking power.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis suggests that once in power, populists can work
considerable harm to the U.S. constitutional system. Their claims to legitimate authority are parasitic on the complexity of representative government
pursuant to the Framers’ carefully calibrated design. Their mode of governance undermines the dispositions of legality and probity that are in practice
necessary predicates for a working constitutional system. And they are likely
to push the polity toward serial violations of political rights and minority
rights. It may then be true, as Müller carefully explains, that populists are
not ipso facto averse to constitutionalism, at least so long as it inclines to
their benefit (pp. 61–62). But in the U.S. context, a populist mode of governance places great strain on the extant constitutional order.
The great advantage of Müller’s monograph is that it isolates and succinctly captures the form of politics that generates these pressures. He further provides important caution against assuming, cavalierly and incorrectly,
that populists need to be tamed by having to rely on entrenched bureaucracies in order to demonstrate policy successes, or that mere constitutional
rules will be alone to rein in populist capture of national high office. At its
core, though, Müller’s argument is a proper cautionary tale about political
movements that view themselves as having a monopoly on truth or right,
and that govern without respect and a measure of reverence for the institutional structures that furnish, and hence render habitable, our democratic
constitution.100 His monograph’s central virtue today is that it makes legible
the nature and extent of the populist challenge to the project of democratic
constitutionalism that has been unfurling, hesitantly and sometimes in the
wrong direction, in the United States since 1789.

100. See Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory 294–95 (2016).

